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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL BOARD OF THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 8560

-vs.SALT LAKE CITY, A Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent

BRIE]j, OF DEFENDANT & RESPONDENT

STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

The statement of procedural facts as presented in
appellant's brief is substantially correct. We wish to
emphasize, however, that Salt Lake City was not charged
with violating any statutory provision as such, but
rather, charges concern activities of the City allegedly
in violation of the regulations entitled "Standards for
Sewage 'Vorks" adopted by the Water Pollution Board
on December 18, 1953. (See Exhibit "A.") The particular regulations sought to be enforced concern details of the construction and operation of the City's
sewer system and read as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"21.4: Water Supply Interconnections: There
must be no permanent physical connection between a public or p·rivate potable water supply
system and a sewer, sewage treatment plant, or
appurtenance thereto which would permit the
passage of any sewage or polluted water into the
potable water supply."
"23.1: Size: No public sewer shall be less
than eight inches in diameter."
"32.7: \ 1entilation: Adequate ventilation
shall be provided for all pump stations. Where
the pump pit is below the ground surface mechanical ventilation is required, so arranged as to
effectively ventilate the dry well and also the
wet well if screens or mechanical equipment requiring n1aintenance or inspection is located in
the wet well. The ventilation equipment should
have a n1inimum capacity of 6 turnovers per
hour under continuous operation. With intermittent operation a 2 nrinute turnover should be
provided."
The Lo,ver Court found "that the Water Pollution
Board has no jurisdiction oYer the se zcer problems presented in this rase.'' (En1phasis added.)
These observations bring us to a consideration of
the activities of Salt Lake City as presented to the
Water Pollution Board at the hearing on September
27, 1955. In order to recognize the nature of the power
annexed hy the board, a factual review of these activities
is necessary.
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First, the alleged violation under Section 21.4 of the
regulations adopted by the Board concerns the utiliz.ation by the city of sewer manholes and flush tanks
conneeted to the City's water Inains. The particular
.system is utilized only in a supervised cleaning program
and operates in the following fashion: At the highest
elevation of every sewer line in Salt Lake City there
is constructed a cen1ent reservoir or tank that will hold
approximately 100 to 200 gallons of water. A mechanical
contrivance is located in the bottom of these tanks so
that when in the cleaning operation \Vater reaches a certain elevation in the tank, it will automatically dump
or permit all of the water to flush out of the tank and
by such force the entire sewer line is cleaned. Any solids
that may have been left along the bottom or sides of the
sewer lines are carried forward. This well or tank is
connected with a one inch line to a city wate-r main,
having a bib or water cock into the flush tank from the
said w:ater mains. (Hearing Tr. 57, 58 & Exhibit #1.)
According to uncontradicted testimony the system
is operated by two men equipped with a truck and with
all proper facilities for making repairs, cleaning sewer
clogs, and replacing worn parts. These men start at
an initial well on a particular day, remove the manhole
cover, light up the well, and carefully determine whether
everything is in proper order. In a book they record
the exact time that they open the valve from the water
main in order to fill the flush tank. The tank will fill
and will be flushed automatically approximately 4 times
an hour. When the flush tank is set in operation, the
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manhole cover is replaced and the workmen go to the
next sewer line and continue for approximately one hour
when they return to the initial well. At this point the
water from the City main is turned off, which is again
recorded in their book, and they once again conduct a
thorough inspection to make absolutely sure that there
is no evidence of any clogging or leakage of any kind.
The manhole cover is replaced and the flush tank remains inactive for a period of approxlinately 30 days
when the same operation is once again performed.
(Hearing Tr. 58, 74 & 75.)
For this particular flush tank system to contaminate
in any way the City's culinary water, there would have
to be a simultaneous joinder of many factors. First, the
sewer would have to clog some distance from the flush
tank and the clogging force the sewage water back up
through the sewer line into the tank, reaching a level
where the sewage "~ater would cover the end of the fresh
water pipe. (Hearing Tr. 23, 24.) At the same time
the water tap 'vould have to be opened during the flushing operations and a break "Tould have to exist in the
City's water line at that particular time and place so
as to cause a negative pressure in the City water main,
and the experienced 'vorkn1en would have to ignore the
facts indicating that a negative pressure exists. (Hearing Tr. 23.) The simultaneous occurrence of all these
factors is ahno~t beyond possibility. (Hearing Tr. 26.)
More than 30 years of detailed records kept in the manner and fashion indicated, conclusively ~how that there
has never been a single failure. (Hearing Tr. 24, 76, 87.)
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This point was made abundantly clear by William Tipton, a professional engineer employed by Salt Lake City
for 36 years, when he stated .at page 94 of the hearing
transcript, as follows:
"It seen1s that something that has operated
sati.sfactorily for as far as I know from the period
of my experience, which has been 36 years, should
continue to operate satisfactorily ... "
It was recognized by counsel for the W.ater Pollution Board that Salt Lake City has a very low incidenc8
of plugged sewer lines, i.e., two per month in over 600
miles of sewer, (Hearing Tr. 85.) and in inquiring as
to the reason for the excellent record, he was informed
that it vvas directly attributable to the effective use of
the flush tank system. (Hearing Tr. 85, 86.) Other
testimonies indieate~d that elimination of the flush tank
system would result in excessive plugging of the City's
sewer lines. (Hearing Tr. 56, 59, 79.)
The Water Pollution Board grounds its regulations
on general standards not applicable to the particular
circu1nstances in Salt Lake City, (Hearing Tr. 27) and
as concerns operation of the Salt Lake City sewer system, Lynn Thatcher, Executive Secretary of the Board
recognized that he was unable to direct the particular
operating pro·blems involved and he said at page 28 of
the hearing transcript:
"I would prefer to leave the exact operation
to the people in the Sewer Department who are
more familiar with the details of operation of the
system."
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The next alleged violation by Salt Lake City under
paragraph 23.1 of the Board's regulations concerns the
use of 6-inch sewer lines rather than 8-inch lines. Generally, in its sewer system the City installs 8-inch lines
(Hearing Tr. 56.); however, under these particular
facts, two pieces of 6-inch pipe were installed, each less
than 100 feet long, serving cul-de-sac roads having a
maximum total potential of 5 service connections. (Hearing Tr. 56.)
Considering the short length of pipe involved,
proper and effective arrangen1ents have been made for
cleaning. (Hearing Tr. 56.)
The regulations of the \)Tater Pollution Board absolutely bar use of 6-inch pipe under any circumstance.
The regulations are based on general standards from
other states and no atten1pt is made to consider the particular problen1 in the area. (Hearing Tr. 12.)
\\Thile 'Yitnesses for the Boai~d testified that generally
clogging fron1 a 6-inch pipe is greater than when an
8- inch pipe is used, these observations did not take into
consideration the particular farts involved in this case.
( H·earing· Tr. 12, 20, 41.)
Even the ,,~itness for the Bo.ard recognized in cross
examination that particular facts such as gradings and
the nun1ber of serYice connections are controlling factors
in deter1nining size of the pipe best suited for the specific needs (llParing Tr. 18.); that it "~ould be possible
to use a pipe too large for existing eircu1nstances (HearSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing Tr. 18.); and that .as long as a 6-inch line could be
cleaned properly, it would be satisfactory. (Hearing
Tr. 19, 48.)
Three witnesses for the City with a combined total
of 57 years' employment by Salt Lake City in this particular field, (Hearing Tr. 55, 74, 89.) and being aware
of the specific needs involved, testified that in the light
of the slope and the linrited nun1ber of service connections, the 6-inch pipe would have greater velocity and
cleaning capacity. (Hearing Tr. 91, 101, 102.) Moreover, the limited amount of water in a 6-inch pipe would
have a greater tendency to push solids through the pipe,
rather than to have a same quantity of water supply
flow around the solids in an 8-inch pipe thereby causing
dangerous accumulations in the sewer line. (I-lea ring
Tr. 87.)
The final alleged violation under paragraph 32.7
of the Board's regulations concerns the wet well located
in the City's se,ver system between State and Main on
6th South Streets in Salt Lake City. This wet well was
constructed to serve the needs of the American I..Jinen
Supply Co., which has a large volume of hot. suds to
be deposited from ti1ne to time during the day while its
laundry is in operation. (Hearing Tr. 60.) In the opinion of the City Engineer it would facilitate the problem
to utilize the large sanitary sewer on Main Street for the
deposit of the suds fron1 the laundry, rather than to
depo.sit in the sewer line immediately in front of the
laundry. (Hearing Tr. 61.) Therefore, the City built
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a cement tank in which the suds from the washing operations are deposited. The tank is provided with a pump
driven by electric power and is so equipped that when
the water in this tank reaches a certain depth, the electric pu1np automatically forces the water into the main
sewer line. The pump stands idle until the water reaches
the specified depth. The objections of the Water Pollution Board are grounded solely on the lack of a ventilating fan in the well to make it 1nore comfortable and the
air less contaminated if a person sl1ould be called upon
to go into this tank for purpose of cleaning and repair.
(Hearing Tr. 14, 17.) The tank is provided with large
manholes which are perforated to give continuous ventilation and these manholes would be removed before a
person could lo\\·er himself into the tank. (Hearing Tr.
20.) A workman would not attempt to clean the tank
during the day while the laundry was depositing hot
suds. Should the electric pump fail in the tank, an automatic by-pass is established so that the suds would be
deposited in the se\ver line directly in front of the laundry. The City did not deem it advisable to ventilate the
well with an electric fan because less danger from gases
exist from the suds than "·ould be the case with a regular
sewer which is not so ventilated; because the heat of
the \vash "Tater in the \ret 'rell ·wrould tend to destroy
the fan; (Hearing Tr. 6.) and because the City has never
had any difficulty or objections from 'vorkmen in cleaning existing se,ver n1anholes having no ventilating fan.
(Hearing Tr. 84.) The only possible complaint that the
Water Pollution Board has is that the well may be an
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unsafe place for a n1an to work. The Board's own witnesses recognized that the well had .absolutely nothing
to do with the pollution of the water_s of the State of
·utah or pollution of Salt Lake City's water sup·ply.
(Hearing Tr. 22~ 49.) Clifford M. Stutz, Sanitary Engineer for the State Health Department (Hearing Tr.
41.) in explaining the Board's regulations, stated at
page 44 of the hearing transcript, as follows:
"So it was our opinion that ventilation equipment was necessary in order to make that chamber suitable for a man to enter .and perform his
work."
The principal point to be derived from the hearing
is that if a contamination did occur, "\vhich is virtually
irnpossible, as a result fron1 any one of the three foregoing objections, the contamination would be only to the
Salt Lake City culinary water system .and would not contaminate any public waters of the State of Utah. (Hearing Tr. 96, 97.) The culinary water of Salt Lake City
is used for bathing, washing, and for sanitary toilets in
the homes. After it has been used in the home, then obviously it is contaminated far more than it could be by
any conceivable difficulty arising from the flush tank
~ystem or the 6-inch sewer line. Ce:rtainly, the health
of the workmen could not under any chain of circumstances, contaminate the public waters of the state or
even the private culinary water of the city. The culinary
water of Salt Lake City is not emptied into the stre.ams
of the State of Utah. (Hearing Tr. 97.) The Board is
concerned with details concerning Salt Lake City's own
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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private water supply rather than with the public waters
of the .state. This will be the focal point of the inquiry
throughout subsequent pages of thi~ brief.

STATEMENT O:B-, POINTS
POINT 1.
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE 'SUBJECT MATTER INVOLVED
IN THIS CASE.

POINT 2.
ACTIONS, FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND ORDERS OF
THE STATE VvATER POLLUTION BOARD INTERFERE
WITH MUNICIPAL FUN.CTIONS AND PROPERTY OF SALT
LAKE CITY IN ·viOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29,
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

POINT 3.
THE DELEGATION OF POWER BY THE LEGISLATURE TO THE WATER POLLUTION BOARD IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEING WITHOUT PROPER STANDARDS
AND PROVIDES THE BOARD WITH ARBITRARY AND
UNREASONABLE DISCRETION.
"""~RGlT~IEXT

POINT 1.
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER INVOLVED
IN THIS ·CASE.

Apprllant in the initial nrgun1ent under Point 1 of
the brief argn('S that the 1nunieipalities are subjeet to the
Water Pollution Art.
e "yish to point out that the issue

'T
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is not necessarily 'vhe.ther municipalities are subject to
the act, but rather whether the statute .and the constitution prevent enforcement of the particular regulations
adopted by the vVater Pollution Board, which are directly
in issue in this case. vVhen the activities Df the city involve other than its own n1unicipal affairs and property,
then the statement of plaintiff may be properly before
the court. The fact is that in interpreting the Utah Water
Pollution Act, it is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to delegate to the Water Pollution Board power
to control the culinary water supply of S.alt Lake City
while the water is retained in city property for distribution to residents of the city. In referring to the Utah
Water Pollution Act, we shall utilize .the code system
as set forth in the 19.55 Pocket Supple1nent of Volume 7
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
In the note following Title 73-14-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, ap·pears the title of the article, which, of
course, i.s an important aid in determining the legislative
intent. The announced power is "to control, prevent and
abate the pollution of sttrface and underground waters
of the state." (En1phasis added.) Culinary water retained
by the City in its waterworks system does not fall into
the foregoing classification of "surface·" and "underground" water.
The policy of the act, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Title 73-14-1, another important aid in determining legislative intent, clearly shows the policies for "conservation
of the water systems of the state" to be used "for public
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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water supplies, for the promulgation of wildlife, fish and
other aquatic life," and for "other legitimate beneficial
uses." Here the water is retained in a private distribution system and is already being used. If the Board
should determine that the wildlife to be protected is polluting the waters, may it assume control over this enormous field as well~ The policy is to control the waste
that may be '~discharged into any waters of the state;'
which is certainly not the case in this action. The legislative intent is clear: To prevent unnecessary pollution
of .streams, rivers, canals, lakes, and underground waters
so that the water may be used in the most beneficial
manner. Title 73-14-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads
as follows:
"Pollution of waters- Public policy of state.
-V\1lereas the pollution of the waters of this
state constitutes a menace to public health and
welfare, ereates public nuisances, is harmful to
wildlife, fish and aquatic life, and impairs domestic, agricultural, industrial, recreational and other
legitimate beneficial uses of water, and whereas
such pollution is contrary to the best interests of
the state and its policy for the conservation of
the water resources of th.e state, it is hereby declared to be the public. poliey of this state to con.serve the 'lt'aJers of the state and to protect,
maintain and improve the quality thereof for
pub! ic u:ater su,pplie s. for the propagation of
'vildlife, fish and aquatir life, and for domestic,
agricultur.a.l, industrial, recreational and other
legitin1ate beneficial uses: to provide that no
waste be discharged into any waters of tke state
without first being given the degree of treatmet~t
necessary to p'rotect the legitimate beneficial uses
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of such ·waters; to provide for the prevention,
abaten1ent and control of new or existing water
pollution; to place first in p.riority those control
measures directed toward elilnination of p·ollution which creates hazards to the public health;
to insure due consideration of financial problems
imposed on water polluters through pursuit of
these objectives; and to cooperate with other
.ag·encies of the state, agencies of other states and
the federal government in carrying out these obje-ctives." (Err1phasis added.)
]{jven though the definitions as set forth in Utah
Code Annotated,. 1953, Title 73-14-2, include the phrase
"drainage systems" in defining waters of the state, the
import of the section clearly shows the intent of the
Legislature to deal with the discharge of waste into public waters as such. This intention is clearly shown by
the exeeption that appears under subsection (f) of the
above title, which reads as follows: " ... except that
bodies of water confined to and retained within the
limits of private property, and which do not develop into
or eonstitute a nuisance, or a public health hazard, or a
menaee to fish or wildlife, shall not be considered to be
'waters of the state' under this definition." (Emphasis
added.)
.

The conclusion that the Legislature intended to deal
only with a classification of waters not including a private water system is substantiated by Title 73-14-4, which
sets for.th the powers and duties of the Water Pollution
Board. Under subsection (i) of the above title the Board
is given the power "to review plans, speeifications or
other data relative to disposal systems or any part there.
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of in connection ""\\lith the issuance of such permits as are
required by this act." (Emphasis added.)
Then the Legislature in the following subsection (j)
deals specifically with the power to issue or revoke "permits for the discharge of wastes into the waters of this
state, . . ." (Emphasis added.) Certainly, it cannot
seriously be contended that any contamination of the
public water supply of Salt Lake City is a "discharge of
wastes into the waters of the state."
The final confirmation of this intention by the Legis~
lature is shown by Title 73-14-5, wherein under subsection (b) the Legislature deals with the activities which
are unlawful 'lvithout securing a permit from the Board,
as follows:
"Pollution unlawful - Public nuisance Activities requiring permits. - (a) It shall be
unlawful for any person to cause pollution as defined in section 73-14-2 (a) of any waters of the
state or to place or cause to be placed any "\vastes
in a location where they "\Yill cause pollution of
.any waters of the state. Any such action is hereby
declared to be a public nuisance.
''(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to
carry on any of the follo,Ying actiYities "\Yithout
first securing such per1nit fron1 the board, as is
required by it, for the disposal of all1castes which
are or 1nay be discharged thet·eby t"nto the waters
of the state: ( 1) the construction, installation,
modification or operation of any treat1nent 'Yorks
or part thereof or any extension or addition thereto; (2) the increase in volume or strength of any
wastes in excess of the permissive discharges speSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cified under any existing permit; (3) the construction, installation, or operation of any establishment or any extension or modification thereof or addition thereto, the operation of which
would ca~use an increase in the discharge of wastes
into the waters of the state or would otherwise
alter the physical, chemical or biological properties of any waters of the state in any manner not
.already lawfully authorized; ( 4) the construction
or use of any new outlet for the discharge of any
~wastes into the waters of the state.
"The board under such conditions as it may
prescribe~ may require the submission of such
plans, specification and other information as it
deen1s to be relevant in connection \Vith the issuance of such pern1its." (Emphasis .added.)
Hence, the only conceivable conclusion that may be
reached is that while the Legislature gave the Water
Pollution Board the po,ver to review plans and specifications concerning disposal systems, (Title 73-14-4 (i) )
which admittedly by definition includes sewer systems
(Title 73-14-2 (e) ) the fact is that the power to review
the plans for a sewer system would not by express language result in the necessity of a permit or be an unlavvful act unless the utilization of the sewer system results
jn a discharge of \Vaste into the waters of the state. As
jndicated in the foregoing, no stretch of the imagination
could lead to this charge under the particular facts involved herein.
Accordingly, the activities of Salt Lake City would
not constitute and are not directed toward disposal of
waste to be discharged in the public waters of the statP.
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(Title 73-14-5 (b) ) ; not a treatment works under sub~
section 1 of the above title; not an increase in volume or
strength of any \vaste in violation of subsection 2 of the
above title; not a construction or operation which would
cause an increase in the discharge of wastes into the
waters of the state, under subsection 3 of the above title;
and certainly not the construction of any new outlet for
the discharge of any waste into the waters of the state.
Where then can the activities of Salt Lake City be unlawful under an expres.s construction of the Water Pollution Act~ The Board has adopted regulations which
totally disregard their power to review plans under
Title 73-14-4 (i) and has interpreted this power of review to include a charge of unlawful activity without the
limitations specifically set forth in Title 73-14-5 (b).
It is the validity of the regulations adopted by the Water
Pollution Board which are in issue which we contend
totally exceed the power granted by the Legislature.
The cases cited by plaintiff on page 5 of appellant's
brief exclusively deal "ith situations where the municipality is in fact discharging sewage into a public river
or strean1 and the ''Tater Pollution Board of the particular state is atte1npting to control this art.
In the ease of State r. City of Juneau, 238 Wis. 564,
300 N.,V. 187, the State Board of Health and the State
Co1nrnittee on 'vater pollution found that the discharge
of inadequately treated sewage into a drainage ditch
caused a nuisance and created condition.s constituting a
menace to wildlife and resulting in damage to property
of riparian owners along the stream.
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Based upon the findings the Board entered an order
requiring the construction of a sewage treatrnent plant.
The Court held the action of the Water Pollution
Board lawful and indicated th.at Article XI, Sec. 2 of the
Wisconsin Constitution did not apply. This section reads
as follows:
"No Jnunicipal corporation shall take private
property for public u.se, against the consent of
the owner, without the necessity thereof being
first established by the verdict of a jury.'' 1 Wis.
Statutes, 1955.
The only other constitutional provision that could
have had any bearing on the case was Article XI, Sec. 3,
as follows:
"Cities and villages organized pursuant to
state law are hereby en1powered, to determine
their local affair.s and government, subject only to
this constitution and to such enactments of the
legislature of s.tate-wide concern as shall with
uniformity affect every city or every village."
1 Wisconsin Statutes, 1955.
The obvious distinctions between the
stitution and Article VI, Sec. 29 of the
tion, hereinafter set forth, demonstrate
of this case as authority for plaintiff's

Wisconsin ConUtah Constituthe inadequacy
position.

The major distinguishing factor is found in the opinion, and, indeed, in the findings and order of the Board,
which deal exclusively with matters that result in the
discharge of waste into public waters. No such factor
exists in the pTesent case.
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The case of City of Superior v. Committee of Water
Pollution, 263 v\ris. 23, 56 N.vV. 2d 501, involved an action
for declaratory judgment brought by the City of Su..
perior. The case simply holds that the procedure established by statute for judicial review was not followed by
the city, and "that a review in the manner attempted
in this action may not be had through the medium of a
declaratory judt,rrnent action." The case doe.s not stand
as authority for the proposition maintained by plaintiff.
The case of Citv of Huntington v. State Water Con~
nzission, 137 \V.\-. 786, 73 S.E. 2d 833, involved a petition
for revie"T of an order of the State \\ater Commission
requiring the city to cease and desist from polluting the
Guyandotte R.iYer and Ohio River and requiring the city
to construct a se,vage treatment plant.
The \\~est \~irginia e.ourt reasoned in upholding the
action of the Board as follows:
"The pollution of the "Taters of the Guyandotte RiYer and the Ohio RiYei\ which the ComInission has found is caused by the se". .age from
the (~ity of Huntington, relates to and affects the
health of the people of this state and is not confined or rPstricted to the health of the inhabitants
of that nntuicipal-ity. In other ''Tords~ the condition \\·hic.h hPre exists is state-zride and not
local." (li~Inpl1asis added.)
ThP eourt stated that the due process clause~ Article
III, ~Pe. 10. of the Sta tt"' c~onstitution, 2 \Y'"est \Tirginia
Code of 1955~ did not a.pply. ~\gain the \"\7 est \"""irginia
(~on8ti tution eonta ins no provision comparable to . .-\.rtirle
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VI, Sec. 29, of the Utah Constitution. The closest analogy
is Article \'I, Sec. 39 (a), 2 \~Test Virginia Code of 1955,
vvhich si1nply en1powers a n1unicipal corporation "to pass
alllavvs and ordinances relating to its municipal affairs.'~

Surely, the "\Vest \7 irginia case cannot stand as authority for the povver assumed by the Water Pollution
Board in the pre~ent situation involved in Salt Lake City.
rrhe case of City of l-Iuntington v. State Water Commission, 135 vV.V. 568, 64 S.E. 2d 225, constituted a first
review of the situation briefed in the immediately preceding paragraphs. Hence, the same distinctions set
forth above apply with equal weight under this authority.
The only problern before the court was the scope of judicial review allowed by the statute, and whe,ther the statutory provision for a review was unconstitutional, thereby
invalidating the entire act. Actually, the case does not
pass on any of the provisions maintained by plaintiff
and is not in point, except that the case does hold, which
again will be of importance in subsequent sections of
this brief, that "\Ve should, if we can, interpret the statute
in such a way as to render it constitutional."
The following authority cited by plaintiff, State
Water Commission v. City of iVoruJich, 141 Conn. 442,
107 Atl. 2d 270, involved a situation where the defendant
city had been ordered to con_struct a sewage treat1nent
plant to eliminate alleged pollution of the Yantic, Shetucket and Thames Rivers. The case deals only with procedural problems and does not in .any way meet the issues
presented to this court. In addition, the Connecticut case
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
involves important factors not found in present litigation: The problem concerned construction of a sewage
treatment plant for sewage that Wa$ being deposited in
public waters.
The case now before the court involves the questions
of sewer lines and local sanitary problems, certainly not
a problem the Legislature intended to meet in the Water
Pollution Act. rrhis is truly a local problem and not a
matter of state "ide concern, as the case of City of Huntington v. State lVater Conu·nission, ~upra, makes clear.
In construing the \\rater Pollution Act, specific stat~
utes grant to the city exclusive control over its property
and must be considered in establishing the legislative intent. ...t\.n unbroken chain of legislation, leading from a
constitutional provision "Thich prohibits the Legislature
from delegating to the Co1nmission control over property
of a municipality, eonclusi\ely shows a legislative history
and intent to leave eontrol of city property in the hands
of elective representatives.
The Constitutional provision reads as follows:
"The legislature shall not delegate to any special conrmission, private corporation or association, any power to 1nake, supervise or interfere
with any 1nunicipal in1provement, money, proper..
ty or effects, "Thether held in trust or otherwise,
to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform
any municipal functions." Article VI, Sec. 29,
Constitution of Utah.
Utah

Code An.nofated_, 1953, Title 10-8-1, reads as

follows:
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"Control of finances and property. - The
boards of conunissioners and city councils of cities
shall have the power to control the finances and
property of the corporation." (Emphasis added.)
It is important to note that the initial section under
the general heading of Power and Duties of Cities contains the mandatory word "shall.'' How may a city fulfill
this mandate if the control over its property is placed
in the hands of the vVater Pollution Board~
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 10-8-2, read.s in
part as follows:

"They may . . . purchase, receive, hold, sell,
lease, convey and dispose of property, real and
personal, for the benefit of the city, both within
and without its corporate boundaries, improve
and protect such property, and may do all other
things in relation thereto as natural p·ersons; provided, that it shall be deemed a corporate purpose
to appropriate money for any purpose which in
the judg1nent of the board of commissioners or
city council will provide for the safety, preserve
the health, promote the prosperity and improve
the morals, peace, order, comfort and convenience
of the inhabitants of the city." (Emphasis added.)
Again, dealing expressly with the question of juris.
diction, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 10-8-15, reads
in part as follo\vs :
"They may construct or authorize the construction of water,works within or without the
city limits, and for the purpose of maintaining
and protecting the same from injury and the
water from pollution their jurisdiction shall extend over the terrritory occupied by such wottks .
. . ." (Emphasis added.)
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Then concerning specifically the .subject of sewers,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 10-8-38, provides in
part as follows :
"Board of commissioners, city councils and
boards of trustees of cities and towns may construct, reconstruct, maintain and operate, sewer
systems, sewage treatment plants, culverts, drains,
sewers, catch basins, manholes, ces.spools and all
systems, equipment and facilities necessary to the
proper drainage, se\Yage and sanitary sewage
disposal requirements of the city or town and
regulate the construction and use thereof." (Emphasis added.)

. A_nd finally, concerning the construction and finanCing of a ~e\\~er, ['tah Code ..._.funotated, 1953, Title 10-7-7,
allo,vs the city to incur indebtedness only- when the propo~ition i~ subn1itted to the Yoters and only when the sewer
.. is o\\~ned and controlled by the municipality-.·· See also
C on.stitutiou of [-tali . .._-\..rticle xrr·, Sec. ·t to the same
effect .
1

. .\nd ~n the i1npo1·tant question: In a eonstruction of
the l~ tah \\Tater Pollution ....-\..ct. does the c.onclusion follow
that the Legislature intended to abrogate the po\vers and
duti(\~ of eitie~ fir1nly established by constitutional and
legi~lati,·p l1i~tory· and court decisions. and by such a
~\\'(\Pping ennehnent rrPate a la"~ "~hirh in fact is uncon1-'titntionaJ, n~ "·ill be subsequently sho\rn.
Legislnture clearlY
. intended to establish a eonl1ni~sion of litnit(\d po\\·ers oYer general pollution of public \va.tP r~. The Board ~s ntten1pted appropriation of
~Phe

\
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additional power, even with the sincere desire to force
their questionable standards upon city property, cannot be allowed.
Moreover, a municipality could eventually become
the pawn of various state agencies competing for powe.r.
If the regulations of the vVater Pollution Board are interpreted as being "\vithin the power conferred upon it
by the Legislature, and the City thereupon removes its
flush tanks, perhaps the Street Department and Health
Department would step into the picture and contend that
without flush tanks public health is endangered. Or suppose the Industrial Comn1ission desires another type of
breathing fan structure in manhole tanks bordering the·
laundry. What then is Salt Lake ,City to do in gove-rning
its own property~ Such a conflict makes apparent the
wisdom of the frame-rs of our Constitution in forn1ulat.ing
Article VI, Section 29, as above set forth. To this same
Constitutional provision we now turn in showing the
activity of the Water Pollution Bo.ard to he unconstitutional.
POINT 2.
ACTIONS, FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND ORDERS OF
THE STATE WATER POLLUTION BOARD INTER.FERE
WITH MUNICIPAL FUN,CTIONS AND PROPERTY OF SALT
LAKE CI'TY IN ·viOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29,
OF THE CONSTIT-UTION OF UTAH.

Article VI, Section 29, of the Constitution of Utah
provides as follows :
"The legislature shall not delegate to any
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ciation, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal in1provement, money,
property or effects, whether held in trust or
otherwise, to levy taxes, to sele-ct a capitol site, or
to perform any municipal functions."
While pollution of the city water system may be a
proper subject for legislative action, in this situation we
do not have an enactment by the Legislature, but rather
a delegation of power to a commission. We are not dealing with the discharge of waste into public waters, but
rather with the culinary water supply of Salt Lake City.
This delegation falls squarely within the constitutional
prohibition.
In this case.. the issue is. not necessaril'
. the constitutionality of the act itself. The court is called upon merely
to detennine its scope in the light of the Constitutional
provision. The act must be construed so as to deprive
the Water Pollution Board of the right to control the
property of Salt Lake City. This contention is substantiated by the foregoing arguments in this brief. If the
statute is not so construed then to that extent it is invalid, since it is in violation of the foregoing provision
of the State Constitution. The 1nost instructive and
controlling case involving tliis question of delegation to
a eo1n1nission is Logau C1~ty r. Public [ 7 tilities Commission, 7:2 l Ttah 536, 271 P. 961.
The Public Utilities Conunission attempted to fix
the rate~ eharged by Logan City in furnishing electricity
to residents of 1nuniripalities fro1u electric po"~er plants
o\vned and operated by the city. The plaintiff city chal·
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lenged the power and jurisdiction of the commission to
interfere with its corporate affair.s. The contentions of
Logan City, as set out below, are identical in substance
to the position held by Salt L.ake City in the present case:
"That a municipality owning and operating
its own plant, and furnishing electrical energy for
its own use and for the use of inhabitants of the
city, is not a public utility within the meaning of
the Public Utilities Act, ... "
The Supreme Court upheld this contention even in
the face of .a definition in the statute that "municipal
corporations" we-re included. We maintain the same reasoning applies here. The court held as follows:
" ... a municipality, owning and operating
its own utility plant for its own use and for the
use of its inhabitants, was not intended to be a
public utility within the meaning of the Utilities
Act, giving the contmission supervision, direction and control over such municipal corporate
affairs and functions. The act does not eo nomine
declare, as do some acts, that a municipality owning .and operating its own util~ty is a 'public
utility' within the meaning of the Utilities Act.
It is only by conside1··ing definitions and making
deductions f'r01n them tha,t such a conclusion is
reached, and, too, one which as has been seen, is
inapplicable to other provisions of the Utilities
Act, inconsistent with subsequent acts of the
Legislature, and, as presently will be noted, repugnant to section 29, a'rt. 6, of our Constitution.
And on fantiliar rules of construction, if two
meanings or constructions may fairly be given
an act, one rendering it in harmony, and the other
in conflict with the Constitution, the {or1ner should
be adopted." (Emphasis added.)
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We vigorously endorse the foregoing language, particularly the final sentence thereof.
Logan City also contended ''that if it he held such
a muncipality is within the act, ... then the act in such
respects is in conflict with Section 29, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the State, and constitutes an unlawful
interference with the private municipal corporate affairR
and functions of the city." Justice Straup and Justice
Hansen in the main opinion upheld this contention by
language particularly applicable to the present case:
". . . To take such power from taxpayers and
citizens of a tO\Yn or city and confer it elsewhere
is, as we think, an unauthorized interference with
the performance of mere corporate and municipal
affairs forbidden by the Constitution.
"If a municipally owned plant is included
'vithin the l~tilities Act as a public utility, then, by
the provisions of the act, \Yhenever ordered by the
con11nission, a municipality, before entering into
a contract for construction ''ork, or for the purchase of any facilities~ or with respect to other
expenditures, is required to sub1nit its proposed
contract, purcl1ase. or other expenditures, to the
conunission for its approYal, and if disapproved
by it. it n1ay order other contracts, purchases. or
expenditures in lieu thereof for all legitimate
purposes and eeononrical "-e Ifare of the utility,
'vhicl1. as it seen1s to us. constitutes a direct supervision oYc·r and interferenee 'Yith tl1e Inunicipal
i1nprove1nents and property and the performance
of n1unicipal funetions and affairs forbidden hy
the Constitution.
"

• • • •
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"We think it clear that the undoubted purpose of the Con.stitutional provision is to hold
inviolate the right of local self-government of
cities and towns with 'respect to municipal improvements, money, property, effects, the levying
of taxes, and the performance of n1unicipal functions. . . . '' (Emphasis added.)
* * * *
". . . To say that the power of the commission, notvvithstanding the c·ons.titution, to sup.ervi.se, regulate, and control the business and fix
rates .and charges of a n1unicip·ally owned and
operated plant is the same a.s tha,t of a privately
owned public utility, is to disregard or not give
effect to the Constitution, for a municipality is
specifically and exclusively mentioned therein, and
the Constitution in such particular expressly and
exclusively adopted for the benefit and protection
of only municipalities.
"Analogou.s to this is the right and power of
the commission to supervise, direct, and control
the business of waterwot·ks, water rights, and
water sources of a municipality owned and controlled by it, and to fix rates and charges of such
utilities .... " (Emphasis added.)
" ... It is hard to believe that by the Utilities
Act it was intended that a municipality owning
and operating its own waterworks or system, before entering into a contract with respect to its
construction or the enlargenLent of it, or in the
purchase of facilities, or incurring exp·e:nditures,
is required to submit to the commission its proposed contract, purchase, or expenditure and, if
disapproved by it~ to order and direct a contr;a.et
or expenditure in lieu thereof. And still more
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difficult is it to ·understand that, if such a power
by the Utilities Act is so delegated to the co'Jnmission, why the act in such particular is not in
direct conflict with the Constitution. The same
reason and observation, as we think, equally apply
to an electrical plant owned and operated by a
municipality for its own use and for the use of
its inhabitants." (Emphasis added.)
Both Justice Gideon and District Judge Woolley
in a concurring opinion recognized that the Constitutional
prohibition is a part of "familiar law," the purpose of
'vhich \vas to '~guarantee to the municipalities local selfgovernment, and to deny to the Legislature any power to
delegate to any body other than the local government
the right of superr isio-n over or interference with the
property of the z;a'rious municipalities ·zcithin the state."
(Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court therefore has expressly covered
the problems of construction, control, and operation of a
water works system of the city which is now before the
court. The facts concern only virtually impossible poilu.
tion of a water system "Thich property is protected fron1
interferenee by an express constitutional provision as
interpreted by the Logau C'ity case. In the face of this
precise authority, and by torturing the legislative intent,
plaintiff contends the lo,rer court erred.
The Logan City ease also expre.ssly holds that the
Constitutional provision applies to "general" and "speeial'' cotnmissions and also applies to "n1unicipal im~
provements, 111oney, prOJJerty, effects, the levying of
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taxes, and the p.erformance of municipal functions." (Emphasis added.)
The contentions of p~laintiff in the Lower Court,
which may be raised in a reply brief, that the Constitutional provision applies only to governmental and not
the proprietary functions of the city, overlooks completely the language of the constitution and the holding of
the Logan City case that municipal improvements and
property, as well as municipal functions are included in
the Constitutional prohibition. It cannot be seriously
maintained that the sewage system in which Salt Lake
City has inves.ted millions of dollars, and has efficiently
managed through experienced employees and expert consultants, is not an improveinent, does not constitute p.rope:ciy of the city, and is not a municipal function.
These cases cited by plaintiff in the Lower Court,
we believe, should be briefed at this point in order to
avoid any misunderstanding which may be cre,ated by a
reply brief. In the case of City v. Cook, 84 Mont. 478, 276
P. 958, the State ~,ire Marshal brought a nuisance proceedings against a building located in Helena, Montana.
The municipality had an ordinance similar to the state
statute giving the State· Fire Marshal the righ.t to in.spect
and condemn buildings. The court distinguished between general functions and municipal functions and
held that on the former concurrent jurisdiction exists.
The court held that fire prote-ction is a governmental
function and therefore the Constitutional prohibition
did not constitute a bar. Certainly, the Cook case is
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e.asily distinguished from the pre.sent litigation involving
a sewe-r system which unquestionably is a municipal improvement and without doubt constitutes municipal property. Additionally, the· Supreme Court of }/fontana was
not faced by a prior decision of such substantial force as
the Logan City case decided by this Honorable c·ourt.
In the ca.se of D&RG RR Co. v. The Public Utilities
CoJnmission of Utah, 51 Utah 623, 172 P. 479, a writ of
mandamus \\'as sought by plaintiff to compel the Public
Service Commission to grant a permit to construct railroad tracks in Salt Lake City without first obtaining a
per1nit from the City Comn1ission. The Supreme Court
held that the Public Service Commission had the exclusive power to determine this point and the writ was
issued. Certainly, this case does not constitute a delegation to a special commission to control, functions or property of the 1nunicipality as attempted by plaintiff in the
present case.
In the case of Pi.rley r. Sanders,. 168 Cal. 152, 141 P.
815, a statute c.reated a. sanitary se"~er district and vested

it

"~it.h

the

po"~ers

of taxation for construction and main..

t0nance of a ~anitary systen1 "co-extensiYe "~ith the territor~·

to be controlled. ., The sole issue "\Yas whether prop-

er1y in an incorporated city e1nbraced in the territory of

thP district

~o

for1ued \\·as subject to taxation. The ease

a frir1ned th(' po,YPr of th(:"\ Se,Yer District to so tax except

whPn the

di~trict i~

con1plet(:"\Iy· absorbed by a mnniei-

pa1 ity·.
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In the present case we do in fact have a situation
where the city has actually absorbed the entire problem
covering its municipal improvements. ~Ioreover, the cre.ation of a s.anitary district with poweTs of taxation for
construction and maintenance of a sewer is in no way
analogous to a creation of a W ate.r Pollution Board
whose sole purpose is to prevent pollution by discharge
of waste into the public "waters of the state," as th.at
phrase is generally known, and not to control the property previously acquired by a municipality. The Legislature of the State of Utah did not intend to create an
agency of such scope and magnitude which would have
the power to determine the details of a waterworks system in every city throughout the state.
It is also irnportant to note that Art. XI, Sec. 13, of
the Constitution of the State of California, adopted in
the year 1879, originally was virtually identical to the
Utah provision which was .adopted in the year 1896.
Utah apparently accepted the California pTovision as it
was originally fran1ed. Subsequently, on November 3,
1914, California amended the said Constitutional provision by adding the follovving exception:
". . . except that ·the Legislature shall have
power to provide for the sup·ervision, regulation
and conduct, in such manner as it may determine,
of the affairs of irrigation districts reclamation
districts or drainage districts, organ'ized or existing under any law of this State."
The· foregoing provision may be found in 2 Cali..
fornia Constitution, ll1ason, Article XI, Sec. 13. Under
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Note 2 of the foregoing citation at page 308 thereof,
appears the following language:
"The Legislature, in all matters touching regulation and conduct of affairs of irrigation district.s, re·clamation districts, or drainage districts,
has been given an enlarged discretion by amendment of 1914 to Art. XI, Sec. 13, and very clear
reasons must appear for whatever objections are
urged against the particular provisions of a statute enacted subsequent to adoption of said amendment before the courts would be satisfied in declaring them void. \V ores v. Imperial Irrigation
Dist. (1924), 193 C 609, 227 P. 181; Hershey v.
Cole, (1933) 130 CA 683, 20 P2d 972; Los Angeles
v. Los Angeles C.F.C. Dist. (1938), 11 C2d 395,
80 P2d 4i9."
Utah retains the full import of the Constitutional
provision as originally adopted which must be enforced
by the courts consistent with the Logan City ca.se. Surely,
the Board and the Legislature must abide by a Constitutional provision 'Yl:tich the people of l'tah have not
seen fit to amend in order to allo". . encroachment upon
local self-goYerninent. ..:\t 11 Cal. Juris. 2d~ Sec. 131, the
fo11o"·ing language appears:
"As one of several devices to insure the indeprndenre of cities, counties~ and public corporations. the constitution provides that the legislature 8hall not delegate to any .special commission, priva tr eorporation, eon1pany. association,
or individual an~· po,rer to Inake . control, approprin.t.<\ supervise, or in any "~a~. . interfere " . .ith any
county·, city. to""n, or municipal hnprovement,
mon~y, property, or effects, ":hether held in trust
or otherwise, or to levy ta...xes or assessments or
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perform any municipal functions whatever. ~n
exception added in 1914 declares that the legrslature shall have power to provide for the supervision, regulation, and conduet, in such manner
as it may determine, of the affairs of irrigation
districts, reclamation districts, or drainage districts, organized or existing under any law of this
state.
"The primary purpose of Article XI, Sec. 13
was to prevent the state legislature from interfering with local governments by the appointment
of its own special connnissions for the control of
purely local matters."
Plaintiff in the Lower Court also relied upon the
case of Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548,
134 P. 560, in which plaintiff brought an action to re-cover
the costs of caring for children of Salt Lake City who
were sent to a detention hon1e administered by the county pursuant to statutory authority. In affirming judgment for plaintiff and holding that the Constitutional
provision against deleg.ation to a special commission
had not been violated, the court at page 565 of the Pacific
Reporter reiterated the controlling factor, as follows:
"Although it has already been intimated in
thi~ opinion, yet, in order to avoid all misconception, we desire to repeat in terms that our conclusions are based upon the express holding that the
interference here involved, under the law in question, is not an interference with any corporate
rights or function of city government." (Emphasis added.)
The SupTeme Court therefore has deemed it of
fundamental importance to distinguish betwe·en. situaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tions where there is in fact an interference with corporate right,s, property and functions of a municipality.
Another case cited by plaintiff in the court below
is State v. Ilolmes, 100 Mont. 256, 47 P. 2d 624, in which
the City of Missoula contended that a statute requiring
payn1ent for insurance on its buildings, which insurance
was obtained by the State Insurance Commissioner, was
an unconstitutional delegation to a special commission,
interfering with the private rights of a city. The court
upheld this contention and entered judgment enjoining
the Insurance Commissioner from enforcing the statute
involved and announced at page 629 of the Pacific Reporter:
"The care and protection of the property of
a municipality is a purely municipal function.
State ex rei. Brooks v. Cook, supra: 43 C.J. 183.
In the case of Hersey v. Xielson, supra, this court,
speaking 'Yith reference to the power of the Legislature oYer 1nunicipal corporation, said: ·Because
of its autonon1ous character-its enjoyment of a
large 1neasure of organic independence - the
1nunieipal eorporation is relieved to a eonsiderahle extent fron1 officious, meddlesome legislation
"~hirh seeks to interfere 'vith its private or propriPta r~~ functions. The theory of loeal self governnlent for 1nunieipal eorporations is fir1uly establishPd in this state."
T-faving di~posed of the case8 cited by plaintiff in
Lo"·p r Cnu rt, "·e no"· turn to a further analysis of Utah
cn~P~ "·hieh nrt' Inort~ directly in point and cover the
part.ieu]ar i ~~nPs involYt~d herein. These Cc'lses are
briPfPd to ~ho"T tht' srope of the enforce1nent under the
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case of Logan C-ity v. Public Utilities Commission, supra,
and the firm ground established by this cour~t in enforcing the Constitutional provision against delegation to a
commission.
A recent case of County Water System v. Salt Lake
City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P. 2d 285, involved a similar
inroad into the basic principal of government by elected
representatives. The action sought a declaratory judgment that Salt Lake City in selling and distributing
water beyond its city lin1its was subject to jurisdiction
of and regulation by the Public Service Commission.
After judgment for Salt Lake City, on appeal the case
was affirmed. The unanimous opinion quotes extensively from the Logan City case, construes the statute there
involved so as to make it constitutional, and cites again
the provisions of Article \i''I, Se:c. 29, of our State Constitution.
The opinion recognizes the fundarnental importance
of ~the Constitutional provision as follows:
"Nevertheless, whatever the considerations
as to the wisdom of the city's being subject to
regulation by the Public Service Commission may
be, it is, perhaps fortunately, not our responsibility to here evaluate these factors and determine
what is rnore desirable as a matter of policy. It is
rather our duty to interpret what was intende·d by
the framers of the constitution and the legislative
enactments thereunder.
". . . The same arguments presented here to
the effect that the city is subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission were presented in the case of Logan City v. Public UtiliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ties Commission, supra. This court rejected then1
upon the reasoning that to allow the commission
to exercise jurisdiction over municipal property
and the n1anagement thereof would be an unconstitutional delegation of power to a special commission forbidden by Article VI, Sec. 29, hereinabove discussed. The law as set out in that case
has long been accepted and is firmly established
as the laui in this jurisdiction. We see no reason
why the Constitutional interdiction does not apply
with equal force to the instant situation." (Emphasis added.)
In holding that the Constitutional provision prohibited the invasion into self government the court emphatically reiterated established law, which, as stated by
the court must be applied with like force to the facts of
the case no'v before the court.
Other Utah cases hav-e consistently added strength
to the bulwark against interference with the inviolate
right of governn1ent by the elected representatives of
the citv. See Lehi l'. Barnes, 7± l . . tah 321, 279 P. 878;
[Ttah Pozrr r & Light Co. c. Public Serrice Conuni~sion,
(Utah, 195:2) 2~9 P. 2d 951. The eases cited below while
not direct I~· in point~ illustrate further application of the
Constitutional prohibition: City o.f Ingle·zcood r. City of
Denve·r, 1~:3 Colo. 290, 229 P. 2d 667: Pasadena v. R.R.
Conz., 18:~ Cal. :l2G, 19:2 P. 25, repudiates the argument
that a n1unicipal corporation in supplying 'vater, light
or po,vpr to its inhabitants is not acting in a governlllental eapar.ity as sovereign and so 1nust be subject to
t11o Pnhlir TTtility Act.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
In each instance when an inroad into Article VI,
Sec. 29 of the Constitution of Utah has been attempted,
the Utah Court has taken a firm stand, indicating an
appreciation of the many hidden complications which
may arise if a special commission is able to control property and affairs of a municipality. Salt L.ake City over
the years has developed a wealth of experience in managing its water supply and sewage system. The policies
are adopted and programs are instigated only after
careful investigation and consultation with nationally
recognized experts. We are served by trained personnel
directly acquainted with the local conditions and methods
best calculated to serve the local problems of the inhabitants. Conversely, the Water Pollution Board has adopted general standards which may be suited to otheT areas
but will undoubtedly crea;te unnecessary cost, expense
and dangers if follo,ved in Salt Lake City. In the hearing
before the "\Vater Pollution Board it was painfully obvious that its expert witnesses and members of the Board
had no first hand knowledge of the local problems which
allegedly are subject to the general standards adop.ted
by the Board. Indeed, the Board did not even understand
the facts of the alleged p·roblems they are attempting to
correet. (Hearing Tr. 20.) It was recognize:d by Lynn
Thatcher that the problerns of managing the sewer system should be left to the people directly involved. (Hearing Tr. 28.) This concept we heartily endorse.
Accompanying an invasion into the inviolate right of
self government and the creation of a myriad of unnecessary expenses and dangers through the control of local
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conditions by general standards, are the resulting legal
problems of responsibility and duty.
rrhis is illustrated by the case of Kiesel & Co.) v.
Ogden City, 8 Utah 237, 30 P. 758, involving a claim for
damages arising fro1n obstruction of a city sewer. The
court recognized that "the City of Ogden possesses the
power to construct and keep in repair, culverts, drains,
sewers, catch basins, manholes and cesspools, and to
regulate the use thereof. 1 Comp. Laws, Utah 1888, Sec.
1755." The court held that "if the sewer when built is
found to be defective or inadequate and injury results
fro1n a neglect to remedy such defects, or inadequacy
when discovered, an action will lie."
In affirming judginent for the plaintiff the court
adopted the follo,ving quotation from 2 Dillon J!ztn icipa!
Corp., 4th Edition, Sec. 1049, as follows:
•• ·.A. 1nunicipal corporation is liable for negli-

gence in the 1ninisterial duty to keep its sewers
( zrhiclz it alone has the pozrer to control and keep
in order). in repair as it respects persons whose
estates are connected therewith by private drains,
in consequence of "-hieh sueh persons sustain.injuries 'rhich "-ould haYe been avoided had the
se,,·ers been kept in proper condition. If the sewer
is negligent1r pernritted to becon1e obstructed or
fi11Pd up. so that it causes the "-ater to back-flow
into r<'lla rs ronn~eted 'vith it. there is a liability
therefor on thf' part of the n1unicipal corporation
hnving control of it . . . . ' " (En1phasis added.)
TlH' pa rPnthetie.al addition b~- the court n1agnifies
t.lH\ pr·ohlPtn involyed in the present case. According to
th0 experts of Salt Lake c~ity. adoption of the general
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standards promulgated by the Water Pollution Board
will lead to an inadequate and dangerous condition, dangers which the city should correct under the Kiesel
case. See also 61 A.L.R. 452. If, however, the Board has
the power to regulate, then may Salt Lake City rely on
the Board's regulations as establishing a standard of
care, thereby depriving an injured person of a remedy~
Or is Salt Lake City liable for conditions ove.r which it
has no control~ Or, perhaps, the Water Pollution Board
will shed its cloak of immunity~
Surely, the Constitutional provision mus.t be given
continued and perpetual importance. The framers of the
Con.stitution wisely protected basic rights which hav~
been preserved by our courts. A misapprehension on the
part of the Water Pollution Board as to the scope of its
authority must be corrected before further encroachments. Only Salt Lake City and its citizens are affected,
and the citizens of the city wish to rely on their chosen
representatives; our citizens have no de$ire for misdirected authority and control from an outside body.
POINT 3.
THE DELEGATION OF POWER BY THE LEGISLATURE T'O THE WATER POLLUTION BOARD IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEING WITI-IOUT PROPER STANDARDS
AND PROVIDES THE BOARD WITH ARBITRARY AND
UNREASONABLE DISCRETION.

The State Legislative body cannot abdicate its responsibility and turn over to a board the power to pass
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ing upon the Board of Commissioners and citizens of
Salt Lake City and which would have the effect of extirpating local control of municipal property and affairs
contrary to Article VI, Sec. 29, of the Constitution of
Utah.
Under the Con.stitutional proVIsion, the power in
question is purely legislative. Logan City v. Public Utili,
ties Commission, supra; Spears Free Clinic & Hospital
for Poor Children, Inc. t:. State Board of Health, 122
olo. 1±7, 220 P. 2d 872; City of Clearwater v. Caldwell,
(Fla., 1954), 75 So. 2d 765; City of Ecorse v. Peoples
Community Hospital Authority, 336 Mich. 490, 58 N.W.
2d 159. If the statute in question is construed as granting the power to the \Y.ater Pollution Board, then the
statute is void and unconstitutional. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Lau·, Sec. 133, page 157. A state does not flourish
because of its officials; it flourishes because its officials
are elected.
1

(

Under Point 1 of tlris brief, we eonclusively showed
that the power sought by the \\""ater Pollution Board
"Tould ha.Ye the effe-ct of repealing a chain of statutes
granting po\\Ter over local property and affairs to the
city. The eoncise rule concerning atten1pted deleg.ation

under

the~0

faets is set forth in 16 C.J.S. Constif:u,tional

Law, Sec. 1~~ at page 555~ as follo"'"S:

"I)o,ver, the exercise of ",.hich would affect
the repeal of existing provisions of general law,
1na!J not be delegated, ... '~ (En1phasis added.)
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The W at'er Pollution Act provides the Board with
uncontrolled and unre.a.sonable discretion. The Board·
is given the power to determine "conditions" under which
it will act, [Jtah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 73-14-4 (f).
The power is included "to adopt, modify, repeal, promulgate and enforce rules and regulations implementing
or effectuating the powers and duties of the. Board,"
thereby giving the Board the power to increase and extend its own powers, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title

73-14-4 (g). As the power is interpreted by the Board,
it constitutes a lofty engineer whose every whim must
be observed and followed or it will grant no permit to
the city to ilnprove or maintain the city'.s own property.
This is true not\\rithstanding the fact that the City may
employ engineers of world renown far superior to the
inexperienced so amply de1nonstrated by the so-called
experts on and e1nployed by the Board.
In discussing the arguments of valid delegation it is
stated in 2 Cal. J1lJris. 2d, Sec. 49, as follows:
"A second requisite, and one of major concern in the law is that the legislature definitely
limit the legislative power-that is, the discretio~
-which it is transferring to a subordinate agency,
by clearly defining the subject of the enabling act
.and the objects which the legislature propo.se.s to
be attained thereunder, and by p~rescribin.g a
policy, including determinate criteria standards,
and guides, to control the administrative agency,
so that its action cannot be arbitrary or capri-

.

ClOUS, •••

"
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Another reason exists for holding the statute unconstitutional should it be interpreted ~s allowing the
power annexed by the Board. The statute is totally silent
on the standards which the Board is to follow in controlling the property of the municipality. Even the general
policy announced by the statute to prevent pollution of
waters of the state would not apply since no such pollution could occur under these facts. The rule is stated in
16 C.J.S. Consti-tutional Law, Sec. 133, at page 561, as
follows:
" . . . a law which vests any person with discretion which is purely arbitrary and which gives
him power to determine what the law shall be in
a particular case is invalid."
The Board created by the Legislature without any
standards of guidance has undertaken to itself the duties
and responsibilities of designing, pla.nnjng and inspecting
all municip.al "~ater",.orks, se\\Tage works~ drainage systc>nl~, or any activity that involves the safety of men at
'York. [t i8 no s1nall 1natter. The costs may run into
1nanY
. 1nillion8 of dollars in initial cost in sanita.rv.. facilitiP~ eontPnlplated and planned by Salt Lake City, followP<l b~~ a t r<~Inendous difference in the cost of operation
throughout thP agPs ahead. {Hearing Tr. 76.)
l.n fact. the po"T<:\r sought by the ''Tater Pollution
Ron rd i 8 a eo1nplett1 annexation of the legislative and
judicial funetion .and is therefore void. Zehender & Fac-

tor 1'. 1J!nrph,11. J +~ Ohio St. 506, 53 N.E. 2d SG-t-. The
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Board sat as legislator and judicial officer and promptly found the city guilty of violating its abortive regulations.
A correlary of the foregoing prop·ositions. is since
the Legislature did not establish sufficient _standards for
control of municipal property by the Board and the st,a,t.
ute is totally inadequate in the matter of establishing
guide posts for the adn1inistrative agencies, this very
inadequacy is compelling evidence that no delegation to
control city property was intended by the Legislature.
The rule is univer.s,al that, "delegation of the Legislator's
authority will not be implied unl·e.ss the intention is
reasonably clear." 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Sec.
133, at page 562. The fact is, as shown by other portions
of this brief, that the statute is subject only to the construction that no delegation of the specific powers sought
to be enforced unde-r the regulations adopted by the
Board was intended. If the _statute is subject to different
interpretations this court will construe the statute in
such a \vay as to make it constitutional. Logan City v.
Public Utilities Commission, supra.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion is inevitable that the Water Pollution Board exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion. If the Board is allowed to enforce its abortive
regulations which purport to control the local affairs and
property of Salt Lake City, it would vest total and far
reaching powers in the hands of a few and encroach
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upon inviolate constitutional rights and duties. It would
extirpate the requirement that elected representatives
must report to their constituents and would elimina~
thi.s basic safeguard against unreasonable exercise of
power. It would usurp the prerogatives of the legli;lative bodies, both state and city, and render self government a vacant privilege. Neither the statute, the Constitution, nor the bulwark of judicial authority permit such
a determination. vVhile we do not impune the motives
of the Board, appointed officials have acted under a mis..
conception of their duties, and we, therefore, believe that
the judgment of the Lower Court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CHRISTENSEN
City Attorney
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